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Abstract 
We analyze corporate charitable behavior and the motivation for it in the Czech and Slovak 
Republics. In our quantitative study we distinguish different channels of support: sponsor-
ing and giving. We do not find evidence supporting the usual claim that foreign firms give 
more than domestic ones, but the results suggest that foreign firms give to maximize profits 
more often than domestic ones. The Czech Republic leads in giving over Slovakia, where 
the importance of large and international firms is higher. No significant decline in giving  
is found in Slovakia after changes in its tax legislation made giving more expensive. 
1. Introduction 
Corporate social responsibility has recently become an  important topic of 
debate and research focusing on the social behavior of firms. Corporate giving as 
an  important aspect of corporate social responsibility has also gained significant 
attention in recent decades in mature economies, as the levels of giving in mature 
economies are significant and therefore represent a major source of funding for non-
profit organizations. Emerging markets have a relatively small amount of corporate 
giving, and therefore not much research on the topic has been performed for emerg-
ing economies. This is especially the case when one considers quantitative empirical 
research.
1 In this paper we aim to fill this gap in the empirical literature by providing 
a quantitative analysis of corporate philanthropy – considered as a still-important 
component of corporate social responsibility – in two post-transformation European 
economies. 
The motives for philanthropic firm behavior are not necessarily purely altru-
istic, for they can have very rational roots. In addition to theoretical considerations, 
there exist empirical studies examining the link between the tax rate and corporate 
philanthropy. For example, in a U.S. study Navarro (1988) found a very small nega-
tive effect of the tax rate, a finding that supports the hypothesis that giving is a form 
of advertising motivated by the maximization of profit. Further, Boatsman and Gupta 
* We would like to thank Richard Steinberg, CORE Conference (Berlin, 2009) participants, and two anon-
ymous referees for useful comments. Financial support of GAýR Grant No. 402/09/1595 is gratefully
acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies. 
1 The vast majority of studies cover the USA (e.g. Boatsman and Gupta, 1996; Navarro, 1988) or the UK 
(e.g. Campbell et al., 2002; Brammer and Pavelin, 2005).  
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(1996) employed panel data and firm-specific variables with a similar dataset and 
showed that giving serves as a quasi-fringe benefit to employees through its impact 
on the community or environment, and that giving is lower due to free riding, as firms 
in communities with a high number of firms give less. Thus, they conclude that giv-
ing is motivated by the maximization of managerial utility under a binding budget 
constraint.
2 In our paper we follow part of the existing literature that is linked to 
the legal framework and tax legislation, using various tax treatments as major factors 
explaining corporate giving. 
From the tax treatment point of view we can identify three major different 
ways in which corporations support nonprofit organizations: sponsoring, giving, and 
tax assignation. Sponsoring is often compared to advertising and is a cost that de-
creases taxable income without further restrictions. The extent of sponsoring is there-
fore affected by the corporate tax rate. Giving can be in financial or “in-kind” form. 
It is a cost that is tax-deductible up to a limit. Therefore, the extent of giving depends 
on both the tax rate as well as the tax-deductible limit. Tax assignation, which exists 
only in a few countries, allows corporations (as well as individuals) to assign a frac-
tion of their taxes to particular purposes, namely, to publicly listed beneficial organi-
zations, which are most often non-profit organizations. 
With respect to the above types of corporate philanthropy the problem with 
the existing empirical studies is that they do not always accurately distinguish be-
tween giving and sponsoring and therefore the tax legislation effect is likely to be 
incorrectly measured. Furthermore, these studies typically cover only one country. In 
this paper we use data on corporate philanthropy in the Czech and Slovak Republics. 
We will analyze the effect of tax policies on corporate behavior. Moreover, we use 
data on two countries that for more than 70 years shared the same history and have 
close cultural roots. Until 1993 both countries were part of the former Czechoslo-
vakia, a federation of these two countries. Following their separation in 1993 these 
countries, which are broadly similar in terms of culture, language, values, ethics, 
norms, etc., adopted different legislation and tax policies. These settings are close to 
a natural experiment and allow us to properly identify the effects of the tax rate and 
tax policies on corporate philanthropy. Since we compare two countries with a long 
common history but different recent evolutions, the observed (recent) differences in 
corporate-giving tax legislation are expected to reveal differences in the  philan-
thropic behavior of firms. Moreover, in our analysis we are also able to distinguish 
between sponsoring and giving, two philanthropic channels that have very different 
tax implications. In other words, we are able to properly identify and test for the im-
portance of tax policies.
3 Last but not least, during the period studied one country 
(Slovakia) changed its policy regarding tax deductibility and allowed tax assignation, 
so we can also estimate the effect of this policy change. The paper thus provides im-
portant insights regarding the relevance of tax policies for corporate philanthropy 
decision-making. 
2 A possible cause of the opposite results in the two studies is the data and measures used. Navarro (1988) 
works with cross-sectional data, thus it is possible that there are unobservable firm characteristics that may
bias the results. Another bias may be caused by measurement error in the tax rate: Navarro (1988) uses
the average tax rate instead of the marginal tax rate, which is used in theoretical models and is also used in
Boatsman and Gupta (1996). 
3 This leads to an empirical evaluation of the Galaskiewicz and Colman (2006) hypothesis that the moti-
vation of companies varies across the different giving tools they employ.  
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The rest of the paper is organized in the following manner. In Section 2 we 
describe the current literature on corporate philanthropy in the two countries. In Sec-
tion 3 we describe the theoretical framework for studying corporate philanthropy and 
formulate testable hypotheses. The data are introduced in Section 4. We present our 
results in Section 5, where we show that the Slovak Republic lags behind the Czech 
Republic, particularly in corporate giving. Further, we fail to find support for the claim 
that foreign firms are more generous than domestic ones (e.g., Bussard et al., 2005; 
BLF CR, 2004). The results about the importance of tax legislation are mixed. Sec-
tion 6 offers our conclusions. 
2. Corporate Philanthropy in the Czech and Slovak Republics 
This study fills a gap in the existing literature as it is one of the few quanti-
tative analyses of corporate philanthropy in European emerging markets. The few 
studies dealing with transformation economies (e.g., Russia: King and Tchepour-
nyhk, 2004; Ukraine: Ilko, 2004; NDS, 2005; Velšic, 2004) are all qualitative. The two 
exceptions are the study by Marþek and Dluhá (2002) analyzing the  donations of 
a sample of 107 Slovak firms, and a study conducted in the Czech Republic by Do-
nors Forum (DF, 2004). The latter is an analysis of a survey of corporate giving in 
the Czech Republic. In the current study, we work with the data from this survey ex-
tended with additional data collected for the Czech Republic and Slovakia. During 
the period 2001–2005, which is the span of our data, both the Czech and Slovak Re-
publics were considered established market economies, as attested by their accession 
to the EU in 2004 (CERGE-EI, 2004; IVO, 2002). The label is optimistic with respect  
to corporate philanthropy, though. Corporate philanthropy in transformation econo-
mies has a short history, as it started to develop only after the demise of the com-
mand economic system. For that reason the  business environment still exhibits 
specific features that may affect the philanthropic behavior of companies and result 
in different behavior than that observed in developed market economies. 
First, the market environment itself is not developed in European emerging 
markets to the extent observed in developed economies and its evolution has typi-
cally been very turbulent. In particular the early years of transition were marked by 
significant uncertainty, low transparency, and high levels of corruption. Problems 
with transparency and corruption also remain present due to inefficient and com-
plicated legal systems (Estrin et al., 2009; Lízal and Koþenda, 2002; CERGE-EI, 
2004).
4 Uncertainty in Slovakia was higher until 1998 due to political instability, 
marked by a severe lack of transparency, corruption, and politically motivated deci-
sions. Many of these problems remained after the change of government in 1998, 
although their intensity decreased significantly (IVO, 2002). A number of important 
changes improving the Slovak market environment occurred in 2003–2004, namely, 
reforms of tax legislation, health care, and the pension system. 
Countries in transition continue to lag behind their more developed counter-
parts also in their economic performance, an  important determinant of corporate 
4 The corruption perception index in both countries is increasing very slowly. That means that the cor-
ruption environment is improving slowly as well. In 2008, it was 5.2 for the Czech Republic and 5.0 for
the Slovak Republic on a 10 point scale (10 being the least corrupt or corruption-free). This translates into 
45
th and 52
nd place, respectively, among 180 countries, according to Transparency International.  
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charity.
5 Lower levels of giving in post-communist countries are, indeed, often ex-
plained by the unfavorable economic conditions (Kivilo, 2005; Ilko, 2004; King and 
Tchepournyhk, 2004; Marþek and Dluhá, 2002). Fidrmuc and Gerxhani (2005) show 
that unfavorable economic conditions during transformation account also for the low 
stock of social capital in post-communist countries, measured by civic participation 
and access to social networks. Nevertheless, the OECD states that both the Czech and 
Slovak Republics have experienced significant economic growth in the periods under 
consideration, which might be a reason for parallel growth in corporate philanthropy. 
A lack of a tradition of philanthropy is another feature of transition countries 
that is expected to strongly negatively influence corporate charitable behavior. The de-
velopment and popularization of corporate social responsibility has been supported 
by the International Business Leaders Forum (BLF), a nonprofit organization with 
national branches in both countries (since 1992 in the Czech Republic and since 2004 
in Slovakia). Nevertheless, the number of companies understanding and implement-
ing the concept of philanthropy remains low in both countries (Czech Republic: BLF 
CR, 2004; Slovakia: WB, 2004).
 One of the possible explanations of this low engage-
ment is, according to the Business Leaders Forum for the Slovak Republic (2005), 
the  ignorance of the  public causing insufficient pressure on companies to get in-
volved. 
Both countries joined the  European Union in 2004, an  important step that 
concluded the accession period that lasted in both countries for more than five years. 
Therefore, we do not place special emphasis on the  point of accession itself and 
observe the  EU’s indirect influence as the  motivation for economic growth and 
increased activity of local and international initiatives supporting philanthropy (BLF, 
Donors Forum).  
Yet another important feature affecting the level of corporate philanthropy is 
the legal framework. The laws in the Czech and Slovak Republics, including those 
relevant to corporate philanthropy, were very similar (e.g., Lízal and Koþenda, 2002) 
until 2004, when several major changes were made in Slovakia. In the short review 
below, we focus on three different tools that corporations use to support nonprofit 
organizations: sponsoring, giving, and in Slovakia also tax assignation. 
The three forms of corporate support can be distinguished based on their tax 
treatment. Sponsoring, governed by a sponsoring contract, is often compared to ad-
vertising. Expenditures on sponsoring enter the books as costs, decreasing taxable 
income without further restrictions. The corporate tax rate is therefore the only legal 
factor that influences expenditures on sponsoring. Due to the income effect, increas-
ing the tax rate increases sponsoring, because its price is lower. However, the income 
from sponsoring is business income for the receiving organization and it has to be 
taxed.  
Giving, governed by a donation contract, includes financial donations or “in- 
-kind” donations of products and services. Expenditures on giving typically represent 
after-tax expenditures that are tax-deductible up to a limit. Therefore, the extent of 
giving depends not only on the corporate income tax rate, as in sponsoring, but also 
on the tax-deductible limit. The limits vary across countries, and their evolution in 
5 Corporate giving remains a relatively stable fraction of before-tax profits in the USA (Clotfelter, 1985; 
Galaskiewicz and Colman, 2006).  
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Table 1  Tax Legislation 
Czech Republic  Slovak Republic 
Limit on tax-deductibility 
2% of tax-base  2% of tax-base 
5% (if natural disaster causes)    
10% for 2002–2003 (floods)      Since 2004 – no deductibility 
Corporate tax rate 
Until 2004            31%   2000–2001          29%  
2004                    28%  2002–2003          25% 
2005                    26%     2004                    19% 
2006                    24%   
2008                    21%    
  since 2003              2% 
Sources: CR: The Act on Income Taxes No. 586/1992 Coll. in the wording of its future amendments;  
SR: The Act on Income Taxes No. 595/2003 Coll. 
 
the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic is summarized in Table 1. The legislation  
in the Czech Republic has become complex, with many additional exemptions and 
changes in the limit having been introduced in the last four years.
6 The limit in Slo-
vakia was stable at 2% of taxable income until 2004, when new legislation abolished 
the deductibility of donations.
7  
Tax assignation exists in Slovakia but not in the Czech Republic. It allows 
corporations (and physical persons) to assign a fraction of their taxes to particular 
purposes, namely, to publicly listed beneficial organizations, most often nonprofit or-
ganizations. The assigned funds belong to the state. The government delegates the de-
cision about how to distribute the assigned funds (collected taxes) to taxpayers if they 
choose to do so. The tax assignation scheme has applied to corporations since 2003 
with a 1% cap. In 2004 the fraction that may be assigned was increased to 2% for 
both corporations and physical persons. While tax assignation for physical persons 
exists in other transition countries,
8 tax assignation for corporations is unique to Slo-
vakia. Tax assignation represents an additional source of funds for nonprofits
9 and 
we include it, to certain extent, in this study even though it is not philanthropy in its 
true sense. Corporations that assign do not donate their own resources, they only 
distribute a fraction of state funds. Nevertheless, firms usually consider assignation 
a form of philanthropy, possibly because assignation requires the firm to make a de-
cision and show some interest in the organization it supports.
10  
6 The Act on Income Taxes No. 586/1992 Coll., as amended. 
7 The Act on Income Taxes No. 595/2003 Coll. In both countries donations had to be deducted in the year
they were given (unlike in the USA, where there is the option to carry forward donations above the limit).
State-owned companies did not have the right to deduct any gifts. Still, we argue that due to the heavy pres-
ence of the state in many privatized firms (Hanousek and Koþenda, 2008) these firms in fact possibly
provided non-marginal donations. 
8 For example, Hungary, where it was first introduced, or Poland (www.onepercent.hu). 
9 Tax assignation is, indeed, a significant additional source of income. In 2004 corporations assigned
SKK 570 million, 92% of the total amount they could have assigned. In addition, SKK 276 million was
assigned by physical persons. The amount has been increasing steadily ever since. The amount assigned by 
corporations was nearly SKK 900 million in 2007, with an additional 380 million assigned by individuals
(www.rozhodni.sk).  
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3. Theoretical Foundations of Corporate Giving 
The theoretical framework for corporate giving was initially developed by Clot-
felter (1985) and was later extended by Navarro (1988). Boatsman and Gupta (1996) 
employed it to illustrate the impact of a budget constraint imposed on the manager, 
and Jankech (2002) used it to account for deductions above the tax deductible limit. 
The basic model and its extensions predict that the tax rate affects the level of dona-
tions if giving is motivated by the maximization of managerial utility, and does not 
affect the level of donations if the company maximizes profit. If there is a budget 
constraint imposed on the managers, then the tax rate will have a negative impact 
when the constraint binds and it will have a positive impact on donations if the con-
straint does not bind. Jankech (2002) proves that these predictions remain valid also 
for the case when there is a binding tax deductible limit on donations.  
However, the  predictions of the  model and its extensions hinge on the  as-
sumption that the model is one period only, which does not allow accounting for 
the long-run payoffs of giving: donations given today bring direct payoffs similar to 
advertising but also build goodwill that pays off in the future. The model of Clotfelter 
(1985) has been extended by Boatsman and Gupta (1996) into a two-period model 
that captures the above long-run effects. However, this two-period model does not 
allow for the maximization of utility; it illustrates only the profit-maximizing case. In 
this setting the  predictions formulated above and used in all previous empirical 
studies do not hold. If a firm maximizes profit over several periods, then the tax rate 
affects the optimal level of giving because it is optimal to shift giving to periods 
when it is cheaper (i.e., when the tax rate is higher). The extent of these shifts de-
pends on the discount factor and the rate of depreciation of accumulated capital. 
If there is no depreciation it is optimal to give most when it is cheapest and 
“live” from the payoffs later on. The rate of goodwill depreciation depends on the cor-
porate environment. Corporations may decrease it by establishing a foundation which 
collects donations in good years and pays them out smoothly over time, ensuring 
payoffs in later periods for a good price.  
In this paper we build on the two-period model of Clotfelter (1985) to allow 
for long-run payoffs of giving in the utility-maximizing case. The theoretical base for 
our empirical analysis will be a model in which we merge the two main philanthropy 
motivations by assuming that a manager’s utility is a convex combination of giving 
and after-tax profit. In that sense, the manager chooses donations and pricing to max-
imize his utility function in the following form:  
> @   > @  
   
1212 1 1 111 1 1
22 2 212 2 2
,,, 1 , ( 1 )
                            1 [ , ] (1 )
     
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GD E D         
(1) 
 ʌ = (1–t) pQ [p, g] – g 
 
Here, ʌ represents the after-tax profit of the company, Q[p, g] is the demand 
function, p is the price of the good produced, g is giving in the given period, Į is 
10 Assignation can have some of the positive effects of philanthropy for firms and therefore should be con-
sidered quasi-philanthropy. According to a survey performed in 2005, 84% of companies considered as-
signation a form of philanthropy (NDS, 2005).  
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the preference of the manager for the maximization of corporate profit, į is the de-
preciation, and ȕ is the “depreciation” of the goodwill of the donation from the first 
period. 
Profit and utility maximization remain limiting cases. The predictions of this 
extended model further support Clotfelter’s (1985) prediction that the tax rate mat-
ters for the level of donations especially if the company gives to maximize its profits. 
In summary, the various extensions of the basic theoretical model of corporate giving 
give mixed predictions regarding the interpretation of the tax rate as an indicator of 
the motivation for giving. We have therefore decided to base our empirical analysis 
on this standard model but refrain from interpretation of the tax rate as the indicator 
of the motivation for giving. 
The empirical model is based on the theoretical model explained above and 
extended to consider organizational characteristics. We examine two specifications, 
one for the  amount spent on sponsoring and one for giving (denoted in general 
philanthropy, Phil): 
             Phili.t= ȕ0 + ȕ1Sizei,t + ȕ2IndDi + ȕ3LopDi + ȕ4Capitali + ȕ5OwnDi +         (2) 
            + ȕ6FDi + ȕ7Year + ȕ8TaxDi + ȕ9CRIIi + μ 
 
The explanatory variables in specification (2) are coded in the following man-
ner: Size captures the size of the company, which is used to normalize the levels of 
giving (big companies give more in absolute terms). Size is measured by two vari-
ables: Sales, the volume of sales, and NoE, the number of employees. Dummy varia-
bles IndD indicate different industries: manufacturing, retail, and services. They cap-
ture possible differences in the reliance on philanthropy across different industries. 
Industries closer to their customers are expected to give more. We use services as 
the benchmark group. Categorical variable LopD indicates the level of operation: in-
ternational, national, or regional. This variable captures the potential power and ex-
pectations of a  company’s stakeholders. Dummy variable Capital indicates firms 
located in the capitals Bratislava or Prague. Dummy variable OwnD indicates dif-
ferent ownership structures: foreign, mixed, or domestic. The variables are expected 
to capture differences in the philanthropic culture and the behavior of domestic and 
foreign owners, as the corporate performance of these firms differs as well (Hanou-
sek, Koþenda, and Svejnar, 2007; Bena and Hanousek, 2008). Dummy variable FD 
distinguishes firms with a foundation or a foundation fund. It captures the possible 
strategic philanthropic behavior of a firm, signaling higher engagement in philan-
thropy. Categorical variable Year captures the possible time trend in giving. Dummy 
variable TaxD represents four dummy variables indicating different corporate tax rates. 
There were three different tax rates in Slovakia and three in the Czech Republic. 
The tax dummies are denoted Tax1 SR (2001), Tax2 SR (2002–2003), Tax3 SR (2004), 
Tax1 CR (2001–2003), Tax2 CR (2004), and Tax3 CR (2005). Two for each country 
are included in the regressions; the third one is set as a benchmark. Dummy variable 
CR II denotes the additional, second sample for the Czech Republic. Technically, we 
use the  logarithmic transformation of the  amount variables (the dependent and 
applicable explanatory variables) to directly obtain estimates of elasticities. Finally, 
in the model we do not include profitability as an explanatory variable because of its 
potential endogeneity. If corporations use philanthropy to maximize profits, then  
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the amount of giving is determined by profitability but it is also expected to affect 
profits. In order to account for the endogeneity of profitability we would have to use 
instrumental variables. Unfortunately, our data set does not contain a  suitable in-
strumental variable. Therefore, we opt for omitting profitability in our specification, 
since omitted variable bias presents a smaller problem than endogeneity. 
The panel format of the data that we collected and describe in detail in Sec-
tion 4 allows accounting for unobservable firm-specific effects using either a random 
or fixed effects specification, REM or FEM (Wooldridge, 2002). We test for the ap-
propriate specification comparing the pooled OLS regression, REM, and FEM. If FEM 
proves to be the correct specification, we estimate an additional random effects model 
on the  residuals from FEM to evaluate the  effects of the  observable firm charac-
teristics of interest (Wooldridge, 2003). We employ Heckman’s two step procedure 
to correct the potential self-selection of firms (Green, 1993). For comparison, we esti-
mate the model also using the interval regression, but this is possible only in the REM 
specification using maximum likelihood.
11 To account for simultaneity in the giving 
and sponsoring decisions we also estimate a system of seemingly unrelated equations. 
3.1 Hypotheses  
The hypotheses are developed based on the  predictions of the  theoretical 
model adjusted to the specifics of transition economies. The lower appreciation of cor-
porate charitable behavior by consumers is captured by the relatively small impact of 
giving on demand, QG > 0, and similarly small utility “payoffs” to managers, i.e., 
utility gained from other perks is higher. On the  other hand, the  uncertain, non- 
-transparent environment of transition increases the  occurrence of principal-agent 
problems, giving managers more opportunities to divert funds. The final effect of 
these factors remains to be tested empirically. In the following account we motivate 
our hypotheses along with their formulations. 
We assume that firms optimize their behavior over several periods and there-
fore have incentives to inter-temporarily shift their donations to years when it is 
cheaper, i.e., when the tax rate is higher. This behavior is enforced by the motivation 
to optimize tax dues: firms, particularly in transition, often seek to minimize their tax 
obligations by avoiding taxes (Hanousek and Palda, 2003 and 2004).
12 The tax rates 
in both countries declined in the studied period and the changes were announced in 
advance, hence, firms were able to shift their donations to earlier periods. The changes 
in the Czech Republic were smaller than those in the Slovak Republic, thus we ex-
pect a lower impact. The most significant changes occurred in Slovakia in 2004, thus 
we expect this change to have the most significant effect. 
Hypothesis 1: The tax policy affects charitable behavior, i.e., the tax rate 
plays a significant role in the giving decision. 
Following Galaskiewicz and Coleman (2006), who suggest that different giv-
ing tools are motivated differently, we distinguish two philanthropic tools: sponsor-
11 There are not sufficient statistics to estimate conditional FEM; the estimates in unconditional fixed ef-
fects are biased (Stata manual). 
12 We claim that firms that engage in philanthropy tend to avoid rather than evade taxes, as they are more 
“visible” because of their philanthropic activities. If they preferred to evade taxes, we claim that they would
not invest in charity and attract unwanted attention. Thus, we do not expect evasion to make estimation 
problematic.  
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ing and giving. Each is subject to a different tax treatment. Sponsoring has a more 
favorable tax treatment than giving, and we therefore expect that the tax rate will 
have a stronger impact on sponsoring. The tax treatment for giving is more favorable 
in the Czech Republic than in Slovakia, so we expect that the preference for sponsor-
ing will be stronger in Slovakia. 
Hypothesis 2: The tax rate has a stronger impact on sponsoring  
than on giving. 
The size of the  company is a  typical factor influencing expenditures on 
philanthropy. This is natural, as large companies have more funds available, thus 
they spend more in absolute amounts also on charity.
13  
Hypothesis 3: Bigger companies spend more on philanthropy. 
The ownership of the company is another factor that influences philanthropy. 
Namely, it is often claimed that foreign owners transplant their home corporate 
culture, where philanthropic traditions are more established (Bussard et al., 2005). 
Companies with foreign owners are therefore expected to take the lead in philan-
thropic behavior in transition economies (e.g., BLF CR, 2004; Bussard et al., 2005), 
possibly due to their better performance (Hanousek, Koþenda, and Svejnar, 2007). 
An additional factor increasing the giving of foreign companies may be a higher need 
to build relationships and goodwill in the country. 
Hypothesis 4: Foreign-owned companies spend more on philanthropy. 
Corporate giving might also be determined by the industry the company op-
erates in (Clotfelter, 1985; Abzug and Webb, 1997). Engagement in philanthropy is 
more important for firms in services because they are closer to their customers and 
need to be visible in the community, and for retail firms because they deal with large 
groups of consumers. These pressures are the smallest in manufacturing. An addi-
tional argument is the relatively lower mobility of firms in services or retail, which 
further increases the importance of community engagement. 
Hypothesis 5: Firms in retail and services spend more on philanthropy  
than firms in manufacturing. 
Firms operating at the local, national, and international levels face different 
conditions and meet different stakeholder groups. Firms operating at the international 
level meet stronger stakeholder groups and operate in an environment with higher 
expectations regarding corporate behavior (Abzug and Webb, 1997). These factors 
increase the pressure to engage in philanthropy. On the other hand, firms operating at 
the regional level are closer to their stakeholders and the needs of the local commu-
nity. Which of these forces is stronger is an empirical question. 
Hypothesis 6: The geographic level of operation affects the philanthropic 
behavior of companies. 
The last factor we want to discuss is location. We assume that the biggest dif-
ference in philanthropic behavior exists between firms located in the capital city and 
those located in other regions. However, what direction this difference goes in is not 
13 Large companies have more funds available, but smaller firms often perform better than large ones
(Hanousek, Koþenda, and Svejnar, 2009).  
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clear. Philanthropic engagement in the capital could be expected to be lower because 
firms in areas with many other companies tend to free ride on the giving of others 
(Navarro, 1988) and it is more difficult to build relationships and cooperation due to 
anonymity. However, engagement could be expected to be higher in the capital be-
cause companies tend to have more resources and there is a higher density of non-
profit organizations, increasing the pressure to give (Navarro, 1988). Which of these 
forces is stronger is an empirical question. 
Hypothesis 7: The philanthropic behavior of firms located in capital cities 
differs from that of firms in other regions. 
4. Data 
Despite considerable difficulties with data availability we assembled a unique 
dataset on corporate philanthropy.
14 Data for the Czech Republic were collected by 
market survey company Median (Median SR in SR) in two surveys using face-to- 
-face interviews: the first sample was collected for the Czech Donors Forum in 2004, 
covering 577 firms over three years (2001–2003), with over-sampling of large and 
medium-sized firms.
15 The second sample was collected in 2006, covering 162 firms 
over five years (2001–2005), focusing entirely on large and medium-sized firms. 
The Slovak sample was collected in 2005, covering 152 firms over four years (2001– 
–2004). Here, too, large and medium-sized firms are over-sampled. Details about 
the  samples are summarized in Table 2. Unfortunately, a  new wave of the  survey 
scheduled for 2008–2009 was cancelled and therefore we have to work solely with 
the datasets mentioned above. 
The focus of our surveys was on quantitative information about corporate 
philanthropy allowing us to test our hypotheses. We collected specific information  
on the amounts spent on sponsoring and giving, the number of entities supported, 
the  areas supported, and the  target groups, and information about the  companies 
(number of employees, industry, geographical area, legal form, level of operation, 
sales, and income before taxes). Because we work with survey data we have to ad-
dress the problem of sample selection: small firms and firms with no or low contri-
butions are less likely to participate in corporate philanthropy (Navarro, 1988; 
Helland and Smith, 2003). This problem is mitigated to some extent by the fact that 
we have information on sponsoring and giving, i.e., we have information for firms 
that did not give but sponsored and vice versa. The second problem is with the qual-
ity of data on philanthropic expenditures: corporations are reluctant to publicize any 
specific information regarding their philanthropic spending (Kivilo, 2004; Múþka, 
2005; Marþek and Dluhá, 2002) and accounting regulation of giving is complicated 
and unclear, particularly for material gifts and services. We addressed this problem 
by allowing the  respondents to report the  spending information in intervals. Un-
fortunately, the first interval (for giving and sponsoring) in the original Czech survey 
14 Only one of the existing studies on the Slovak Republic includes information on the amounts spent (for 
2001, Marþek and Dluhá, 2002). The only study on the Czech Republic is the one by Donors Forum (DF, 
2004); we work with this data.  
15 A representative sample would consist 98% of firms having less than 50 employees, providing insuffi-
cient information on big firms, which are the most important givers. In addition, the sample included a group
of big firms specified by Donors Forum, which may bias the results slightly, even though the sample was 
made representative afterwards.  
112                                    Finance a úvČr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 60, 2010, no. 2 
Table 2  Structure of the Samples 
   CR I  %  CR II  %  SR  % 
Number  of  employees        
Less than 50  310  54  -  -  67  44 
50–250  194 34  108 67 56 37 
250–1000  48  8 41 25 25 16 
1000  and  more  25 4  13 8 4 3 
Ownership        
Foreign  38  7 21 13 21 14 
More  foreign  31 5  10 6 9 6 
More  domestic  54  9 41 25 26 18 
Domestic  454 79 90 56 94 62 
Level  of  operation        
International  90 16 50 31 48 33 
National  148 25 65 40 57 38 
Regional  339 59 47 29 43 29 
I n d u s t r y         
Manufacturing  248 43  110 68 90 60 
Retail  135 23  7  4 27 18 
Services  194 34 45 28 33 22 
Total  577 100 162 100 152 100 
Sources: CR I: Survey by Donor’s Forum (DF, 2004), CR II: Survey on request of the authors conducted by 
Median CR in 2006, SR: Survey on request of the authors conducted by Median SR in 2005. All, 
three surveys used the same questionnaire to allow for comparison. Authors’ computation. 
 
Table 3  Comparison CR/SR, Basic Indicators 
    Sponsoring  Giving  Assigna-
tion 
    CR  SR  Wald test  CR  SR  Wald test  SR 












Amount  471.75 
(63) 
133.41 






Amount (CI)  317.13 
(-24.4) 
167.43 






Amount/profit  0.33 
(0.04) 
0.11 


















Notes:Standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes significant difference between the means in CR and SR 
at 1%. 
Amounts are in thousands CZK, adjusted for inflation with base year 2001.Common intervals (CI) allow 
a better comparison of the samples. They group data from the narrow intervals in the SR and CR II sam-
ples to form the large first interval in the original CR sample, and vice versa for the high categories. 
 
was very broad, up to CZK 200,000. As a result nearly 79% of the reported giving 
(company/year) fell into this interval. In the subsequent surveys we split this interval 
into four subcategories, and to maintain the number of intervals we merged the top 
three intervals.
16 Lastly, the  respondents reported the  information retrospectively, 
which also decreases the quality of the data. However, this problem was mitigated by 
arranging the interviews in advance and giving the respondents time to prepare. 
16 Throughout the study we work with different intervals for different samples. We provide results with com-
mon intervals when different from the standard.   
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Table 3 summarizes the aggregate information for both countries: the fraction 
of firms that participate in sponsoring/giving (Participation), the  average amount 
spent on sponsoring/giving (Amount), the  average amount reported in common 
intervals (CI), sponsoring/giving as a fraction of profits before taxes (average amount 
divided by profit before tax, Amount/profit), and sponsoring/giving as a fraction of 
profits before taxes in CI. The data in Table 3 and subsequent estimations are weight-
ed to be representative of the population of firms in the country. We used the Wald 
test to test for the equality of means between the two countries; the results are pro-
vided in the last column.  
We observe that the two countries are very different: sponsoring participation 
and expenditures as a fraction of profit in CI are the only categories where we fail to 
reject the null hypothesis of equality between the countries. The differences between 
the data reported using the original and common intervals illustrate the biases caused 
by the size of the original first interval (Slovak Republic) and the merging of the last 
intervals (Czech Republic). Nevertheless, even in common intervals the differences 
between the countries remain significant and Slovakia lags behind the Czech Repub-
lic. One reason may be a difference in the profitability of companies: profits in Slo-
vakia are significantly below those in the  Czech Republic (the average profit in 
the Czech Republic was CZK 227,431,000, while that in the Slovak Republic was 
CZK 14,040,000).
17 Assignation participation (Slovak Republic) is significantly above 
giving participation (at the 10% level). A comparison of assignation participation to 
that obtained in the unweighted sample illustrates that small firms assign less often.
18 
This result is in line with the fact that the probability of low (zero) profit among 
small firms is higher because these firms pay no or low taxes, so they have nothing to 




In this section we report the results on sponsoring and giving participation 
and, for the Slovak Republic, also participation in assignation. The sponsoring and 
giving specifications also provide an estimate of Heckman’s selection parameter, Ȝ. 
The model is estimated separately for the Czech and the Slovak Republics because 
the Chow test of the equality of coefficients rejected the hypothesis of equality of 
the two samples. The test failed to reject the hypothesis in the comparison of the two 
Czech samples, so we merge the two. To account for the difference in levels
20 we use 
a dummy variable (CR II) denoting the second sample. We estimated a linear probabil-
ity model, probit, and a system of seemingly unrelated equations, but we report only 
17 The difference is driven by the less than 1% of firms with very high profits, which are missing in
the Slovak sample. The result is even stronger when we take into account that the fraction of firms that 
reported profits was higher in the Slovak Republic; more than 70% of firms in Slovakia reported a profit, 
while the fraction in the Czech Republic is only around 50%. 
18 This comparison is available on request. 
19 We have no data on the amounts assigned. This question was omitted from the survey as we did not ex-
pect any company to assign less than the 2% allowed by law. However, we did ask the companies wheth-
er they used assignations to the full extent, and only 9% responded that they assigned less than 2%. 
20 The original sample included several large donors.  
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Table 4  Participation, Random Effects Probit 
Sponsoring Giving  Assigna- 
tions   
CR SR CR  SR  SR 













































































































































No. of obs.  1665  504  1665  504  254 
Log-likelihood -608.92  -107.12  -611.94  -139.33  94.57 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%. 
Tax1 CR denotes the first tax period in the CR, 2001–2003, Tax2 CR, 2004, Tax3 CR denotes 2005 
and serves as benchmark for the Czech Republic (omitted from the regression). 
Tax1 SR denotes the first tax period in the SR, 2001, Tax3 SR the last one, 2004. Tax2 SR denotes 
the period 2002–2003 and serves as a benchmark (omitted from the regression). See Table 1 for de-
tails. 
 
the results from probit random effects, because the results did not differ significantly 
and probit is used for Heckman’s selection correction.
21  
The results summarized in Table 4 illustrate that there are significant dif-
ferences between the two countries: there is strong support for Hypothesis 3, that 
large companies are more active in the Czech Republic, since both the number of 
employees and sales have a positive impact on participation. In the Slovak Republic, 
the results are weaker and mixed: sales have a positive impact on sponsoring, and 
21 Results from the other estimations are available on request.  
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the number of employees has a positive impact on giving participation. There is 
a strong difference also in Hypothesis 6, on the international level of operations: we 
observe higher giving participation of local firms in the Czech Republic, while in 
Slovakia companies on the international level participate more often in both spon-
soring and giving. Interestingly, we do not find strong support for Hypothesis 4, that 
foreign firms are more active: we observe only weak support for the hypothesis in 
Czech giving. The remaining results are either not significant or even negative, such 
as sponsoring participation in Slovakia. In both countries we observe that firms in 
the capitals are less active in philanthropy (Hypothesis 7). This may be a sign of free- 
-riding, since there is high concentration of companies and some expect that others 
will take care of philanthropy, or the anonymity of the city makes it difficult to es-
tablish partnerships. We do not observe any strong significant results for Hypothe- 
sis 5 (the role of industry). 
Finally, we observe a strong positive time trend in participation in the Czech 
Republic, while this trend is missing in Slovakia. We observe no significant impact 
of changes in tax rates, contrary to our expectations, particularly in Slovakia (Hy-
pothesis 1), although the missing growth in Slovakia offers partial support for the ne-
gative impact of these changes.
22  
5.2 Expenditures on Philanthropy 
Tables 5 and 6 summarize the results from the main specifications for expendi-
tures on sponsoring and giving. To account for potential selection bias we include 
among the explanatory variables Heckman’s Ȝ obtained from the participation equa-
tions summarized in the  previous section. As in the  previous analysis we merge 
the two Czech samples and analyze Slovakia separately. We used the Hausman test 
to compare the  suitability of fixed and random effects; the  test rejected the  null 
hypothesis of independence of firm-specific effects and the error term in both specifi-
cations. Thus, we estimated FEM, and the results are summarized in Table 5.
23 In 
order to test the hypotheses regarding the observed firm characteristics we estimated 
a random effects model on the residuals from the fixed effects regression as describ-
ed in the methodology section above. The results of these estimations are summariz-
ed in Table 6.
24  
The coefficients on Heckman’s Ȝ are insignificant in Slovakia, i.e., selection 
bias does not present a major hurdle. Therefore, in the decomposition regression be-
low we report results from the models without correcting for selection bias.
25 The co-
efficients in the  fixed effects model (FEM) specification are insignificant even 
though the explanatory power of the models is high (measured by the adjusted R
2). 
Therefore, we can conclude that neither sales (with the exception of giving in the Czech 
Republic) nor taxes have an effect on expenditures on philanthropy: We fail to sup- 
22 We suspect that corporate philanthropy in Slovakia has similar “potential” to grow as in the Czech 
Republic, due to the favorable economic evolution, GDP growth, and the development of infrastructure 
supporting corporate philanthropy as summarized in Section 4 above. 
23 We also tested for the suitability of panel data estimation versus stacked pooled data estimation; the test 
rejected pooled estimation. 
24 We provide results from the fixed and random effects only. The results from the control treatments (in-
terval regression, seemingly unrelated regression) did not differ significantly and are available on request. 
25 We do not provide results from the fixed effect estimation as they are similar to those provided.  
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Table 5  Expenditures, FEM with Heckman's Correction 
Sponsoring Giving 
   
CR SR CR SR 


























Tax1 SR    0.22 
(0.16)   
0.15 
(0.31) 
Tax3 SR    -0.17 
(0.17)   
0.06 
(0.28) 

















No. of obs. 
0.59 
          1062 
0.9 
           312 
0.67 
         1183 
0.76 
            229 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%. 
 
Table 6  Expenditures, Decomposition of Firm Effects 
 Sponsoring  Giving 


















































































































CR II  -2.03*** 
(0.21) 
 
















Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.    
*** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%, respectively.  
SR 2 column provides results from additional specification developed to examine the impact of 
the legislative changes in Slovakia in 2004 on different ownership forms.     
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port Hypothesis 1, as there is no significant decline in giving in Slovakia after 2004 
(the coefficient on Tax3 SR). The only evidence we have to this end is the missing 
growth of participation (contrary to the Czech case) described in the previous section. 
We also fail to support Hypothesis 2, a different impact of taxes on sponsoring and 
giving, or a difference between the two countries. This result is caused by two facts: 
many of the relevant determinants were captured in the participation decision and 
the main explanatory power for the expenditure decision is in the firm-specific char-
acteristics, which are observable only in the subsequent regressions on the residu-
als.
26 Results from these regressions follow. 
Size, as measured by the number of employees, was found to have no effect on 
expenditures on sponsoring. In giving, however, we observe opposite effects in the two 
countries: in the Czech Republic small firms give more than firms with many em-
ployees, but the opposite is true in Slovakia. The negative impact of size in the Czech 
Republic indicates an increase in the importance of philanthropy among small com-
panies, a trend that is not present in Slovakia yet. The finding that small firms give 
more in terms of their profits than large companies is in line with the results of Guth-
rie et al. (2008), who show a larger impact of smaller firms. Generally, the wisdom 
that large firms spend more on charity and philanthropic activities has been success-
fully questioned by several reports from mature markets.
27 However, the overall ef-
fect of small versus large corporations is still not completely answered: while we found 
that small corporations in the Czech Republic give more in relative terms, we did not 
analyze the total (direct and indirect) impact of large corporations on philanthropy 
and corporate giving. It is quite plausible that large firms give smaller amounts in 
terms of their profits but their impact is important as they are visible and through 
their visibility they show that corporate philanthropy is an important and valuable 
activity.  
Ownership (Hypothesis 4) has different impacts on sponsoring and giving: 
while it does not affect expenditure on sponsoring, foreign-owned firms spend sig-
nificantly less on giving. These results fail to support Hypothesis 4, that foreign firms 
are the leaders in philanthropy. Moreover, foreign-owned firms are more profit driv-
en, as observed in an additional test on the Slovak sample. We added interaction 
terms between the year 2004 and ownership among the explanatory variables because 
the 2004 change was expected to have the strongest effect on expenditures. The re-
sults (SR 2, the third column of Table 6) support this expectation. While the domestic 
firms did not change their behavior significantly in 2004, the foreign firms did: we 
observe an increase in sponsoring expenditures; the effect on giving is negative but not 
significant. This result suggests that sponsoring and giving are substitutes and profit- 
-oriented firms shift towards the cheaper one. 
We observe no difference in spending on sponsoring among industries. Firms 
in retail, and in Slovakia also those in manufacturing, spend less on giving. Thus, we 
partially support Hypothesis 5, that firms in services give most (though they give 
26 When looking at the results it is necessary to keep in mind that we only analyze the information for 
firms that gave or sponsored (in at least one year) and reported the information on their sales. 
27 For example, a large research report by Hall et. al. (2008) shows that the total value of contributions from
large corporations as a percentage of pre-tax profits is actually lower than that of the broader business 
community (median value of 1.0% vs. 1.25%, respectively). The same relationship is found when the per-
centage of total revenues is used (median of 0.06% compared to 0.63%).  
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least often), followed by firms in retail and manufacturing. The difference between 
sponsoring and giving may result from their different nature, giving being a result of 
stakeholders’ pressure and their closeness to the  company, and sponsoring being 
aimed at attracting customers, similarly to advertising. 
The level of operation (Hypothesis 6) matters only for expenditures on spon-
soring. In the Czech Republic, regionally operating firms spend more on sponsoring, 
but in Slovakia they spend the least. We observe no differences in giving. The ab-
sence of a  difference in expenditures between firms at the  international and local 
level is positive, though we have to keep in mind that local firms in Slovakia do par-
ticipate significantly less often. 
Regarding Hypothesis 7, we observe that firms in Prague spend more on giv-
ing than firms in other regions. We observe no other difference. We are not able to 
identify the specific motives for such behavior. One possible reason is a positive cor-
relation between profitability and location in Prague. As we do not control for profits 
in the specification, location might capture some of this effect. 
We observe that the levels in the second sample are significantly below the lev-
els in the old one. The Chow test of similarity of coefficients failed to reject the hypo-
thesis of no difference; the only difference is in the level captured by CR II. This is 
possibly caused by the non-random choice of some participants in the original Czech 
survey – the important donors. Even though the additional companies were chosen so 
that the sample would become representative, the inclusion of these major donors 
may cause upward bias in the level of giving. 
To address the problem of the bad structure of the first interval in the original 
Czech sample we estimated the same specifications using common intervals. In ad-
dition, we did not use the middle point of the first interval but instead used the av-
erage of the observations obtained from the additional samples. This estimation was 
used to observe the effect of the merging of the first interval. The results from this 
control treatment did not differ significantly from the results presented above, with 
one exception: the coefficients of the two tax dummies (Tax2_CR, Tax1_SR) were 
significant.
28 This difference suggests that merging the intervals may emphasize dif-
ferences that would otherwise remain unobservable. On the  other hand, the  large 
intervals were not created with any theory in mind, thus the observed effect is likely 
to be artificial. Choosing a different merging of intervals would probably lead to 
a different result. Nevertheless, the results obtained offer some support for the hypo-
thesis that there is a difference in the motivation for sponsoring and giving, spon-
soring being motivated more strongly by the maximization of profits than giving. 
6. Conclusion 
In this study we analyzed the corporate philanthropic behavior of firms in two 
transition countries, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, using survey data on 739 firms 
in the Czech Republic and 152 in Slovakia. The results reveal that despite the long 
common history of the two countries there are significant differences in the current 
philanthropic behavior of firms. Namely, firms in the Czech Republic gave more often 
and significantly more than firms in Slovakia. In addition, giving in Slovakia is more 
28 The results of this estimation are available on request.  
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prevalent among large firms operating on the international level, while in the Czech 
Republic smaller, regional firms also participate. These differences between the coun-
tries seem to be caused by differences in profitability, reinforced by missing “leaders” 
in Slovakia, i.e., large Slovak firms give less than large Czech firms. The differences 
in sponsoring behavior are smaller. 
One of the  major questions of this study was the  impact of taxes: did de-
creasing corporate tax rates affect corporate philanthropy? If we looked only at 
the significance of tax variables the answer would be no, none of the changes had 
a significant impact on either sponsoring or giving. According to Navarro’s interpre-
tation (Navarro, 1988) this means that corporate philanthropy is motivated predomi-
nantly by the  maximization of managerial utility and not by profit maximization. 
However, these results need to be considered with caution because the changes in tax 
rates in the Czech Republic were rather minor. In Slovakia, the differences were big-
ger, in particular the tax change in 2004. The fact that the change in 2004 did not have 
any negative impact on the level of giving suggests that the tax legislation seems not 
to have an impact on the philanthropic behavior of firms. But we believe it is im-
portant to take into consideration that contrary to the Czech Republic, philanthropic 
engagement or expenditures in Slovakia did not grow in the studied period despite 
strong economic growth. Thus, the potential positive growth was prevented by simul-
taneous changes in the tax legislation. 
To further evaluate the impact of the tax change in 2004 in Slovakia we ana-
lyzed it separately for firms with different ownerships. We observed that while 
the change had no effect on firms with domestic or mixed ownership, it had a sig-
nificant effect on firms with foreign owners, which shifted their support to sponsor-
ing in 2004, suggesting that foreign firms are more profit-motivated than domestic 
ones. In general, though, we did not find support for the hypothesis that firms with for-
eign capital give or sponsor more. We observed that foreign-owned firms in the Czech 
Republic give more often, but their expenditures are below those of other firms.  
While in the Czech Republic we observe significant growth in participation in 
both sponsoring and giving, participation in Slovakia has remained stable, despite sig-
nificant economic growth and activities in support of corporate philanthropy. The par-
ticipation of foreign-owned firms in Slovakia is significantly below the participation 
of domestic firms in sponsoring. Their expenditures on sponsoring are similar, but 
they are significantly below those of domestic firms in giving. We failed to support 
our hypothesis regarding higher engagement of firms in services, with the excep- 
tion of sponsoring in the Czech Republic. Their expenditures on giving, however, are 
the highest in both countries. This may result from the fact that the profitability of 
firms in services is the lowest when compared to other industries, having a negative 
effect on participation. On the other hand, once they start to engage in philanthropy, 
possibly because of their close relationships with stakeholders, the firms tend to give 
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